A rich but tractable variant of the Burdett-Mortensen model of wage setting behavior is formulated and a dynamic market equilibrium solution to the model is defined and characterized. In the model, firms cannot commit to wage contracts. Instead, the Markov perfect equilibrium to the wage setting...

This paper proposes a theoretical framework to analyze the impacts of credit and technology shocks on business cycle dynamics, where firms rely on banks and households for capital financing. Firms are identical ex ante but differ ex post due to different realizations of firm specific technology...

This paper questions unconventional fiscal policy effects when the monetary policy rate is at the zero lower bound. We provide evidence for the US that the spread between the policy rate and the US-LIBOR, which is more relevant for private sector transactions, increases with government...

The risk of default that business firms face is very significant and differs widely across countries. This paper explores the links between countries' business conditions and international trade embedment and the default risk at the country level from a theoretical point of view. Our main...

While many employees risk losing their job and having their career disrupted due to employers' financial distress, it is widely recognized that many leave their employer in anticipation of layoff. In this paper, we assess how employee costs of financial distress depend on employees learning and...

In this paper, I analyze India's approach to capital account liberalization through the lens of the new literature on financial globalization. India's authorities have taken a cautious and calibrated path to capital account opening, which has served the economy well in terms of reducing its...

This paper develops an adaptive learning model under uncertainty that examines evolution of capital account polices over time and across developing regions. In the framework, countries' past experiences and IMF programs influence policymakers' beliefs about the impact of capital account...

We study the incentive effects of grating supervisors access to objective performance information when agents work on multiple tasks. We first analyze a formal model showing that incentives are lower powered when supervisors have no access to objective measures but assess performance...