Showing 1 - 10 of 523
We analyze a long-term contracting problem involving common uncertainty about a parameter capturing the productivity of the relationship, and featuring a hidden action for the agent. We develop an approach that works for any utility function when the parameter and noise are normally distributed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009303458
This paper studies the design of optimal contracts in dynamic environments where agents learn by doing. We derive a condition under which contracts are fully incentive compatible. A closed-form solution is obtained when agents have CARA utility. It shows that human capital accumulation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010246654
This paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa. We hypothesize that corruption … that the shadow economy reduces corruption in high income countries, but increases corruption in low income countries. We … also find that stricter regulations increase both corruption and the shadow economy. -- corruption ; shadow economy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003332206
We develop a model of strategic contractual incompleteness that identifies conditions under which principals might omit even costlessly verifiable terms. We then use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of the model. While it is well known that verifiability imperfections can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010457849
We develop a new approach to quantify how patients respond to dynamic incentives in health insurance contracts with a deductible. Our approach exploits two sources of variation in a differences-in-regression-discontinuities design: deductible contracts reset at the beginning of the year, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012199099
In this paper, we examine the impact of pay-for-performance incentives on learning-by-doing. We exploit personnel data on fruit pickers paid under two distinct compensation contracts: a standard piece rate plan and a piece rate plan with an extra one-time bonus tied to output. Under the bonus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012005340
We investigate how payoff-irrelevant terms can negatively impact relational contracts. In a lab experiment we compare two economically equivalent contracts - a fixed-term renewable and an open-ended at-will contract. Each contract provides partners with full flexibility regarding the length and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011893426
In a recent paper, Hart and Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long term contracts and important aspects of the employment relation. However, so far there exists no direct evidence that supports these assumptions and, in particular, Hart and Moore's notion that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003793317
We investigate corruption as a social dilemma by means of a bribery game in which a risk of collective sanction of the …' corruptibility but is not sufficient to eliminate the Tragedy of corruption that leads both firms and officials to earn less than in … the absence of corruption. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011528171
This paper analyzes the relationship between gender and corruption, controlling for country-specific heterogeneity in a … the involvement of women in society and the absence of corruption. However, once country-fixed effects are acknowledged … corruption by 2.5 index points (scale from zero to ten). Surprisingly, the link between the share of women in the labor force and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376241