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Producer protection legislation and termination damages in the presence of contracting frictions
Wu, Steven - 2009
This study models producer protection legislation that would grant growers the right to claim damages (PPLD) if their contracts are prematurely terminated. In the absence of contracting frictions that prevent contractors from redesigning contracts to accommodate exogenous policy changes, PPLD...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003894440
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Market imperfections and firm-sponsored training
Picchio, Matteo; Ours, Jan C. van - 2010
Recent human capital theories predict that labor market frictions and product market competition influence firm …, product market competition does not have an effect on firm-sponsored training. We conclude that increasing competition through …-sponsored training ; labor market frictions ; product market competition ; matched worker-firm data …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003975223
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Relational contracts and the economic well-being of nations
Kukharskyy, Bohdan; Pflüger, Michael - 2010
, Gibbons and Murphy (2002). -- aggregate welfare ; theory of the firm ; relational contracting ; firm heterogeneity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009314275
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A product market theory of worker training
Gersbach, Hans; Schmutzler, Armin - 2004 - revised: February 2004
We develop a product market theory that explains why firms invest in general training of their workers. We consider a … employees and finally engage in imperfect product market competition. Equilibria with and without training, and multiple … equilibria can emerge. If competition is sufficiently soft and trained workers are substitutes, firms may invest in non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011402873
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Distributional effects of competition: a simulation approach
Rodríguez-Castelán, Carlos; Araar, Abdelkrim; … - 2021
Welfare and Competition tool (WELCOM), to estimate with minimum data requirements the direct distributional effects of market … telecommunications and corn products. The results show that increasing competition from four to 12 firms in the mobile telecommunications …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012418634
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Physician payment contracts in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection : the theory and its application to Ontario
Kantarevic, Jasmin; Kralj, Boris - 2015
We develop a stylized principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection to provide a unified framework for understanding some of the most salient features of the recent physician payment reform in Ontario and its impact on physician behavior. These features include: (1) physicians...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011288527
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Understanding severance pay
Parsons, Donald O. - 2013
Severance pay, a fixed-sum payment to workers at job separation, has been the focus of intense policy concern for the last several decades, but much of this concern is unearned. The design of the ideal separation package is outlined and severance pay emerges as a natural component of job...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010195446
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The simple analytics of job displacement insurance
Parsons, Donald O. - 2016
and in combination, introduce potentially serious contracting concerns. Economic theory provides a practical guide to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011455569
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Moral-hazard-free first-best unemployment insurance
Parsons, Donald O. - 2016
Unemployment insurance replacement rates world-wide are well below 100 percent, a fact often attributed to search moral hazard concerns. As Blanchard and Tirole (2008) have illustrated, however, neither search nor layoff moral hazard (firing cost) distortions need arise in first-best insurance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011455570
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The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
Berg, Gerard J. van den; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011449662