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with reflections on the future of relational contract theory and practice. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013500553
managers, coupled with bonuses based on their leadership rank among all leaders. Our intervention increased worker productivity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014278019
We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003984691
Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009303451
leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with non-integration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the … managers. The division managers' job is to create profitable investment projects. Giving the managers incentives to do so … hierarchically structured firms in which higher-level managers coordinate the actions of lower-level managers. -- theory of the firm …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003464116
divisions to replace high incentive pay to the division heads by incentives based on private benefits of control. In that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009721377
research (Davies & Fafchamps, 2017) has shown that managers in Ghana are reluctant to use monetary incentives to motivate …Firm surveys have shown that labour management in developing countries is often problematic. Earlier experimental …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011607573
We run a field experiment to investigate whether competing in rank-order tournaments with different prize spreads affects individual performance. Our experiment involved students from an Italian University who took an intermediate exam in which one part was awarded on the basis of their relative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011455813
"descriptive norm") what they really value (the "prescriptive norm"), thus presenting her with a tradeoff between incentives and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011476544
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that there need not exist a competitive equilibrium in markets with adverse selection. Building on their framework we demonstrate that externalities between agents - an agent's utility upon accepting a contract depends on the average type attracted by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003831629