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Second-degree moral hazard in a real-world credence goods market

Balafoutas, Loukas; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2013

Empirical literature on moral hazard focuses exclusively on the direct impact of asymmetric information on market outcomes, thus ignoring possible repercussions. We present a field experiment in which we consider a phenomenon that we call second-degree moral hazard - the tendency of the supply...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010207314

Dynamic contracts and learning by doing

Prat, Julien - 2014

This paper studies the design of optimal contracts in dynamic environments where agents learn by doing. We derive a condition under which contracts are fully incentive compatible. A closed-form solution is obtained when agents have CARA utility. It shows that human capital accumulation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010246654

Incentivizing school attendance in the presence of parent-child information frictions

De Walque, Damien; Valente, Christine - 2018

Education conditional cash transfer programs may increase school attendance in part due to the information they transmit to parents about their child's attendance. This paper presents experimental evidence that the information content of an education conditional cash transfer program, when given...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011880395

How successful are banking sector reforms in emerging market economies? : evidence from impact of monetary policy on levels and structures of firm debt in India

Bhaumik, Sumon Kumar; Kutan, Ali Mustafa; Majumdar, Sudipa - 2016

that well-functioning credit markets would reflect a bank channel for monetary policy at work, we test whether a change in … and the associated change in interest rate does not affect change in bank credit, change in total debt and the proportion … of bank credit in total debt for any of the firms. We discuss the policy implications of the findings. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011493763

Till debt do us part : strategic divorces and a test of moral hazard

Kim, Yeorim; Mastrogiacomo, Mauro; Hochgürtel, Stefan; … - 2022

We test whether households that face prospective home equity losses during a house price downturn use divorce to shed debt. We study the Dutch context, where qualifying homeowners can buy into a mortgage guarantee scheme that insures the lender against borrower default and transfers the risk to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013329569

Division of labour and directed production

Ratto, Marisa (contributor); Schnedler, Wendelin (contributor) - 2005

We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003011512

Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave

Englmaier, Florian; Mühlheußer, Gerd; Roider, Andreas - 2010

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003984691

Producer protection legislation and termination damages in the presence of contracting frictions

Wu, Steven - 2009

This study models producer protection legislation that would grant growers the right to claim damages (PPLD) if their contracts are prematurely terminated. In the absence of contracting frictions that prevent contractors from redesigning contracts to accommodate exogenous policy changes, PPLD...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003894440

Hidden action, identification, and organization design

Schnedler, Wendelin - 2010

Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability? When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction? This paper shows that any restriction of implementability is caused by an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009303451

The dilemma of delegating search : budgeting in public employment services

Addison, John T.; Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin; Kuhn, Thomas - 2010

The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009006957