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Wage-hours contracts, overtime working and premium pay
Hart, Robert A. (contributor); Ma, Yue (contributor) - 2008
This paper offers a contract-based theory to explain the determination of standard hours, overtime hours and overtime premium pay. We expand on the wage contract literature that emphasises the role of firm-specific human capital and that explores problems of contract efficiency in the face of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003771694
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Contracts as reference points : experimental evidence
Fehr, Ernst (contributor); Hart, Oliver D. (contributor);  … - 2008
In a recent paper, Hart and Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long term contracts and important aspects of the employment relation. However, so far there exists no direct evidence that supports these assumptions and, in particular, Hart and Moore's notion that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003793317
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Strategic mismatches in competing teams
Kräkel, Matthias - 1999
This paper discusses the strategic role of mismatching, where players voluntarily form inefficient teams or forego the formation of efficient teams, respectively. Strategic mismatching can be rational when players realize a competitive advantage (e.g. harming other competitors). In addition, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011313938
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The economics of credence goods : on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009
determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields … efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation … higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. -- Credence goods ; experiment ; liability ; verifiability ; reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003814341
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Replication in economics
Hamermesh, Daniel S. (contributor) - 2007
This examination of the role and potential for replication in economics points out the paucity of both pure replication checking on others' published papers using their data and scientific replication using data representing different populations in one's own work or in a Comment. Several...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003590624
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Contracts as rent seeking devices : evidence from German soccer
Feess, Eberhard (contributor); Gerfin, Michael (contributor) - 2008
Recent theoretical research has identified many ways how contracts can be used as rent seeking devices vis-à-vis third parties, but there is no empirical evidence on this issue so far. To test some basic qualitative properties of this literature, we develop a theoretical and empirical framework...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003777942
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Reputations, relationships and the enforcement of incomplete contracts
MacLeod, William Bentley (contributor) - 2006
This paper discusses the literature on the enforcement of incomplete contracts. It compares legal enforcement to enforcement via relationships and reputations. A number of mechanisms, such as the repeat purchase mechanism (Klein and Leffler (1981)) and efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003278957
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Optimal unemployment insurance for older workers
Hairault, Jean-Olivier; Langot, François; Ménard, … - 2009
This paper shows that optimal unemployment insurance contracts are age-dependent. Older workers have only a few years left on the labor market prior to retirement. This short horizon implies a more digressive replacement ratio. However, there is a sufficiently short distance to retirement for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003825176
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Competition, hidden information and efficiency : an experiment
Cabrales, Antonio (contributor); Charness, Gary (contributor) - 2006
"We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent of unknown type. In our second treatment, a principal can select one of three agents, while in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003373398
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Formal and informal risk sharing in LDCs : theory and empirical evidence
Dubois, Pierre (contributor); Jullien, Bruno (contributor);  … - 2007
We develop and estimate a model of dynamic interactions between households where commitment is limited and contracts are incomplete to explain the patterns of income and consumption growth in village economies of less developed countries. Households can insure through both formal contracts and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003599696