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Implicit contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment : thirty years on

MacLeod, William Bentley; Malcomson, James M. - 2023

with reflections on the future of relational contract theory and practice. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013500553

More than the money : payoff-irrelevant terms in relational contracts

Cromwell, Erich; Goerg, Sebastian J.; Ziółkowska, Monika - 2018

two economically equivalent contracts - a fixed-term renewable and an open-ended at-will contract. Each contract provides … partners with full flexibility regarding the length and termination of their interaction. When only one contract type is … contract type. However, when both contracts are available offering a fixed-term instead of an open-ended contract is perceived …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011893426

Second-degree moral hazard in a real-world credence goods market

Balafoutas, Loukas; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2013

Empirical literature on moral hazard focuses exclusively on the direct impact of asymmetric information on market outcomes, thus ignoring possible repercussions. We present a field experiment in which we consider a phenomenon that we call second-degree moral hazard - the tendency of the supply...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010207314

Division of labour and directed production

Ratto, Marisa (contributor); Schnedler, Wendelin (contributor) - 2005

We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003011512

Physician payment contracts in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection : the theory and its application to Ontario

Kantarevic, Jasmin; Kralj, Boris - 2015

behavior. These features include: (1) physicians can choose a payment contract from a menu that includes an enhanced fee …-for-service contract and a blended capitation contract; (2) the capitation rate is higher and the cost-reimbursement rate is lower in the … blended capitation contract; (3) physicians sort selectively into the contracts based on their preferences; and (4) physicians …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011288527

On the "adverse selection" of organizations

Kräkel, Matthias (contributor) - 2006

According to New Institutional Economics, two or more individuals will found an organization, if it leads to a benefit compared to market allocation. A natural consequence will then be internal rent seeking. We discuss the interrelation between profits, rent seeking and the foundation of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003384915

Dynamic contracts and learning by doing

Prat, Julien - 2014

This paper studies the design of optimal contracts in dynamic environments where agents learn by doing. We derive a condition under which contracts are fully incentive compatible. A closed-form solution is obtained when agents have CARA utility. It shows that human capital accumulation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010246654

An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance

Hagedorn, Marcus (contributor); Kaul, Ashok (contributor); … - 2002 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001743999

Subjective evaluations : discretionary bonuses and feedback credibility

Fuchs, William - 2013

We provide a new rationale for the use of discretionary bonuses. In a setting with unknown match qualities between a worker and a firm and subjective evaluations by the principal, bonuses are useful in order to make the feedback from the firm to the workers credible. This way workers in good...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221557

Empowerment and the dark side of delegation

Kräkel, Matthias - 2018

The existing delegation literature has focused on different preferences of principal and agent concerning project selection, which makes delegating authority costly for the principal. This paper shows that delegation has a cost even when the preferences of principal and agent are exogenously...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011795221