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More than the money : payoff-irrelevant terms in relational contracts
Cromwell, Erich; Goerg, Sebastian J.; Ziółkowska, Monika - 2018
two economically equivalent contracts - a fixed-term renewable and an open-ended at-will contract. Each contract provides … partners with full flexibility regarding the length and termination of their interaction. When only one contract type is … contract type. However, when both contracts are available offering a fixed-term instead of an open-ended contract is perceived …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011893426
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Inputs, incentives, and self-selection at the workplace
Amodio, Francesco; Martinez-Carrasco, Miguel A. - 2019
This paper studies how asymmetric information over inputs affects workers' response to incentives and self-selection at the workplace. Using daily records from a Peruvian egg production plant, we exploit a sudden change in the worker salary structure and find that workers' effort, firm profits,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012147088
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Division of labour and directed production
Ratto, Marisa (contributor); Schnedler, Wendelin (contributor) - 2005
We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003011512
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Physician payment contracts in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection : the theory and its application to Ontario
Kantarevic, Jasmin; Kralj, Boris - 2015
behavior. These features include: (1) physicians can choose a payment contract from a menu that includes an enhanced fee …-for-service contract and a blended capitation contract; (2) the capitation rate is higher and the cost-reimbursement rate is lower in the … blended capitation contract; (3) physicians sort selectively into the contracts based on their preferences; and (4) physicians …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011288527
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Dynamic contracts and learning by doing
Prat, Julien - 2014
This paper studies the design of optimal contracts in dynamic environments where agents learn by doing. We derive a condition under which contracts are fully incentive compatible. A closed-form solution is obtained when agents have CARA utility. It shows that human capital accumulation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010246654
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An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance
Hagedorn, Marcus (contributor); Kaul, Ashok (contributor);  … - 2002 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001743999
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Empowerment and the dark side of delegation
Kräkel, Matthias - 2018
The existing delegation literature has focused on different preferences of principal and agent concerning project selection, which makes delegating authority costly for the principal. This paper shows that delegation has a cost even when the preferences of principal and agent are exogenously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011795221
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Mixed up?: That's good for motivation
Koch, Alexander K. (contributor);  … - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]
An essential ingredient in models of career concerns is ex ante uncertainty about an agent's type. This paper shows how career concerns can arise even in the absence of any such ex ante uncertainty, if the unobservable actions that an agent takes influence his future productivity. By...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002452300
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The response to dynamic incentives in insurance contracts with a deductible : evidence from a differences-in-regression-discontinuities design
Klein, Tobias J.; Salm, Martin; Upadhyay, Suraj - 2020
We develop a new approach to quantify how patients respond to dynamic incentives in health insurance contracts with a deductible. Our approach exploits two sources of variation in a differences-in-regression-discontinuities design: deductible contracts reset at the beginning of the year, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012199099
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You don't always get what you pay for
Schnedler, Wendelin (contributor) - 2007
Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003561637