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Standards, innovation incentives, and the formation of patent pools

Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2010 - This version: November 16, 2010

Technological standards give rise to a complements problem that affects pricing and innovation incentives of technology … producers. In this paper I discuss how patent pools can be used to solve these problems and what incentives patent holders have … to form a patent pool. I offer some suggestions how competition authorities can foster the formation of welfare …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008823190

Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market

Bester, Helmut - 2009

This paper studies investment incentives in the steady state of a dynamic bilateral matching market. Because of search … underinvestment on both sides of the market. But when market frictions become negligible, the equilibrium investment levels tend …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003848877

Incidence and growth of patent thickets : the impact of technological opportunities and complexity

Graevenitz, Georg von; Wagner, Stefan; Harhoff, Dietmar - 2011

We investigate incidence and evolution of patent thickets. Our empirical analysis is based on a theoretical model of … patenting in complex and discrete technologies. The model captures how competition for patent portfolios and complementarity of … patent thickets is introduced. European patent citations are used to construct measures of fragmentation and technological …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009012623

The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests

Schweinzer, Paul; Segev, Ella - 2008

We show that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n-player Tullock tournaments assigns the entire prize pool to the winner, provided that a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists. If such an equilibrium fails to exist under the winner-take-all structure, we construct the optimal prize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343930

Adding a stick to the carrot? : the interaction of bonuses and fines

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2007

In this paper we report on a principal-agent experiment where the principal can choose whether to rely on an unenforcable bonus contract or to combine the bonus contract with a fine if the agent's effort falls below a minimum standard. We show that most principals do not use the fine and that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365854

Fairness and contract design

Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2005 - This version: November 5, 2005

We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371080

The economics of fairness, reciprocity and altruism : experimental evidence and new theories ; chapter written for the Handbook of reciprocity, gift-giving and altruism

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2005 - This version: June 6, 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371081

Breach remedies, performance excuses, and investment incentives

Schweizer, Urs - 2008

. Alternative regimes, in contrast, where he is excused if performance is inefficient or even is extremely costly distort investment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343927

Hierarchical structures and dynamic incentives

Shin, Dongsoo; Strausz, Roland - 2010

We study the optimal hierarchical structure of an organization under limited commitment. The organization cannot make a long term commitment to wages and output levels, while it can commit to its hierarchical structure. We show that the optimal hierarchical structure is horizontal when it is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003953962

Tournaments versus piece rates under limited liability

Kräkel, Matthias - 2004

Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004: The existing literature on the comparison of tournaments and piece rates as alternative incentive schemes has focused on the case of unlimited liability. However, in practice real workers' wealth is typically restricted....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343971