Showing 1 - 8 of 8
We study endogenous group formation in tournaments employing experimental three-player contests. We find that players in endogenously formed alliances cope better with the moral hazard problem in groups than players who are forced into an alliance. Also, players who are committed to expending...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198496
We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576771
Colluding firms often exchange private information and make transfers within the cartels based on the information. Estimating the impact of such collusive practices" - known as the 'lysine strategy profile (LSP)" - on cartel duration is difficult because of endogeneity and omitted variable bias....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571067
Crime has to be punished, but does punishment reduce crime? We conduct a neutrally framed laboratory experiment to test the deterrence hypothesis, namely that crime is weakly decreasing in deterrent incentives, i.e. severity and probability of punishment. In our experiment, subjects can steal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365846
We study the consequences of leniency - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps deterring illegal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366558
Law makers increasingly try to capitalize on individuals having acquired knowledge of corporate crimes or other misconduct by inducing them to blow the whistle. In a laboratory experiment we measure the effectiveness of incentives on the willingness to report such misconduct to a sanctioning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011517818
Law makers increasingly try to capitalize on individuals having acquired knowledge of corporate crimes or other misconduct by inducing them to blow the whistle. In a laboratory experiment we measure the effectiveness of incentives on the willingness to report such misconduct to a sanctioning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011557173
This paper studies cartels' strategic behavior in delaying leniency applications, a take-up decision that has been ignored in the previous literature. Using European Commission decisions issued over a 16-year span, we show, contrary to common beliefs and the existing literature, that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009685867