Showing 1 - 10 of 125
This paper studies a principal-agent relation in which the principal's private information about the agent's effort … and not on the public signal. Nonetheless, public information is valuable as it facilitates truthful subjective evaluation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781395
to contribute to the team output. We vary the type of information the second mover receives prior to his effort choice …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003909260
measures, I argue that subjective evaluations might sometimes also be used to withhold information from the worker. I … furthermore argue that withholding information is particularly important under circumstances where the credibility issue is small …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198959
Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on the trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle on the positive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383018
information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198514
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer's problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010436207
We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822065
hazard. To model the procurer's roblem, we extend a standard sequential screening model to endogenous information acquisition … with moral hazard. The optimal contract displays systematic distortions in information acquisition. Due to a rent effect …, adverse selection induces too much information acquisition to prevent cost overruns and too little information acquisition to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935679
Consider a two-product firm that decides on the quality of each product. Product quality is unknown to consumers. If the firm sells both products under the same brand name, consumers adjust their beliefs about quality subject to the performance of both products. We show that if the probability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365881
additional information. Due to a double moral hazard problem, there exists a tension between incentives for effort and incentives … additional information. Due to a double moral hazard problem, there exists a tension between incentives for effort and incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366544