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Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? : an experiment

Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah - 2008

We implement the Rawlsian veil of ignorance in the laboratory. Our experimental design allows separating the effects of risk and social preferences behind the veil of ignorance. Subjects prefer more equal distributions behind than in front of the veil of ignorance, but only a minority acts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343920

An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis

Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah; Strassmair, Christina - 2008

the deterrence hypothesis, namely that crime is weakly decreasing in deterrent incentives, i.e. severity and probability … of punishment. In our experiment, subjects can steal from another participant's payoff. Deterrent incentives vary across … incentives, subjects steal more the stronger the incentives. We observe two types of subjects: selfish subjects who act according …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365846

Adding a stick to the carrot? : the interaction of bonuses and fines

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2007

actually pay the announced bonus. This offers a new explanation for why explicit and implicit incentives are substitutes rather …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365854

Risk taking in winner-take-all competition

Kräkel, Matthias; Nieken, Petra; Przemeck, Judith - 2008

We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players. At stage one, common risk is chosen by one of the players. At stage two, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneously invest in a winner-take-all competition. The game is solved theoretically and then tested by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366511

Emotions and the optimality of unfair tournaments

Kräkel, Matthias - 2005

-workers. Assuming heterogeneity among the workers the interplay of emotions and incentives is analyzed within the framework of rank … the main idea of a tournament is inducing incentives by making workers compare themselves with their opponents. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343963

Incentives and information as driving forces of default effects

Altmann, Steffen; Falk, Armin; Grunewald, Andreas - 2015

The behavioral relevance of non-binding defaults is well established. While most research has focused on decision makers’ responses to a given default, we argue that this individual decision making perspective is incomplete. Instead, a comprehensive understanding of default effects requires to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011345779

Hidden benefits of reward : a field experiment on motivation and monetary incentives

Kvaløy, Ola; Nieken, Petra; Schöttner, Anja - 2013

interaction with monetary incentives. We find that motivational talk significantly improves performance only when accompanied by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342223

Feedback in tournaments under commitment problems : theory and experimental evidence

Gürtler, Oliver; Harbring, Christine - 2007

In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals in-termediate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365864

The economics of fairness, reciprocity and altruism : experimental evidence and new theories ; chapter written for the Handbook of reciprocity, gift-giving and altruism

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2005 - This version: June 6, 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371081

Performance pay and multidimensional sorting : productivity, preferences and gender

Dohmen, Thomas; Falk, Armin - 2011

This paper studies the impact of incentives on worker self-selection in a controlled laboratory experiment. Subjects …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009012616