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Reference points in renegotiations : the role of contracts and competition

Bartling, Björn; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012

Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this hypothesis in a canonical buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571567

Screening, competition, and job design : economic origins of good jobs

Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2009

-sharing, screening opportunities, and competition are important driving forces behind these new forms of work organization. We document … competition substantially fosters the trust strategy, reduces market segmentation, and leads to large welfare gains for both …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935665

Social preferences and competition

Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2009

There is a general presumption that social preferences can be ignored if markets are competitive. Market experiments … (Smith 1962) and recent theoretical results (Dufwenberg et al. 2008) suggest that competition forces people to behave as if … hold when uncertainty is important (financial markets) or when incomplete contracts are traded (labor markets). Social …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935667

Identification and estimation of intra-firm and industry competition via ownership change

Michel, Christian - 2013

This paper proposes and empirically implements a framework for analyzing industry competition and the degree of joint …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198515

Competition with exclusive contracts in vertically related markets : an equilibrium non-existence result

Schutz, Nicolas - 2013

I develop a model in the spirit of Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990), in which two upstream firms compete to supply a homogeneous input to two downstream firms, who compete in prices with differentiated products in a downstream market. Upstream firms are allowed to offer exclusive two-part...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010200431

Unique equilibrium in two-part tariff competition between two-sided platforms

Reisinger, Markus - 2010

Two-sided market models in which platforms compete via two-part tariffs, i.e. a subscription and a per-transaction fee, are often plagued by a continuum of equilibria. This paper augments existing models by allowing for heterogeneous rading behavior of agents on both sides. We show that this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950444

Information acquisition in conflicts

Morath, Florian; Münster, Johannes - 2010

This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. First, we characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two players with one-sided asymmetric information where one player has private information about his valuation. Then, we use ou rresults...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950481

Domestic rivalry and export performance : theory and evidence from international airline markets

Clougherty, Joseph A.; Zhang, Anming - 2008

The much-studied relationship between domestic rivalry and export performance consists of those supporting a national-champion rationale, and those supporting a rivalry rationale. While the empirical literature generally supports the positive effects of domestic rivalry, the national-champion...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343919

Bank competition : when is it good?

Hainz, Christa - 2008

The effects of bank competition and institutions on credit markets are usually studied separately although both factors … are interdependent. We study the effect of bank competition on the choice of contracts (screening versus collateralized … effects of bank competition on collateralization, access to finance, and social welfare depend on the institutional …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343924

The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests

Schweinzer, Paul; Segev, Ella - 2008

We show that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n-player Tullock tournaments assigns the entire prize pool to the winner, provided that a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists. If such an equilibrium fails to exist under the winner-take-all structure, we construct the optimal prize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343930