Showing 1 - 10 of 27
We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that combines a license auction with royalty contracts to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935644
This paper reconsiders the licensing of a common value innovation to a downstream duopoly, assuming a dual licensing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935649
The literature on license auctions for process innovations in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winning bid and stressed that this gives firms an incentive to signal strength through their bids, to the benefit of the innovator. In the present paper we examine whether revealing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010378352
This paper revisits the licensing of a non-drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly …. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more … profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed-fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365856
The present paper reconsiders the inside innovators’ licensing problem under incomplete information. Employing an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285324
Inspired by some spectrum auctions, we consider a stylized license auction with incumbents and one entrant. Whereas the entrant values only the bundle of several units (synergy), incumbents are subject to non-increasing demand. The seller proactively encourages entry and restricts incumbent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009685869
This paper revisits the standard analysis of licensing a cost reducing innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot … oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines elements of a license auction with royalty licensing by granting the losers … licensing without reducing bidders' surplus; therefore, it is more profitable than both standard license auctions and pure …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371073
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents, in the presence of hidden action and hidden information. Securities range from cash to equity and call options. 'Steeper' securities are better surplus extractors that narrow the gap between the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571056
This paper reconsiders experimental tests of the English clock auction. We point out why the standard procedure can only use a small subset of all bids, which gives rise to a selection bias. We propose an alternative yet equivalent format that makes all bids visible, and apply it to a 'wallet...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010370528
This paper evaluates how R&D subsidies to the business sector are typically awarded. We identify two sources of ineffciency: the selection based on a ranking of individual projects, rather than complete allocations, and the failure to induce competition among applicants in order to extract and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366543