Similar Search Results

Expectation damages, divisible contracts, and bilateral investment

Ohlendorf, Susanne - 2008

This paper examines the efficiency of expectation damages as a breach remedy in a bilateral trade setting with renegotiation and relationship-specific investment by the buyer and the seller. As demonstrated by Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), no contract that specifies only a fixed quantity and a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383019

Fragmented property rights and R&D competition

Clark, Derek J.; Konrad, Kai A. - 2006

Where product innovation requires several complementary patents, fragmented property rights can be a factor that limits firms' willingness to invest in the development and commercialization of new products. This paper studies multiple simultaneous R&D contests for complementary patents and how...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365878

Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem

Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2005

In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation-specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371083

Hold-up and the use of performance-sensitive debt

Adam, Tim R.; Streitz, Daniel - 2014

We examine whether performance-sensitive debt (PSD) is used to reduce hold-up problems in long-term lending relationships. We find that the use of PSD is more common in the presence of a long-term lending relationship and if the borrower has fewer financing alternatives available. In syndicated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010403671

Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship

Fiocco, Raffaele; Gilli, Mario - 2014

setting, we explore the scope for collusion between the regulator and the firm, which results in the manipulation of the … regulator's report on the firm's costs to Congress. The firm's bene.t of collusion arises from the higher price the efficient … collusion only if the regulator's bargaining power in the regulatory relationship is relatively high. Then, we derive the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371305

Collusion and durability

Strausz, Roland; Sasaki, Dan - 2008

-monotonic in the number of firms; 4) a regulator may demand inefficiently high levels of durability to prevent collusion. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343926

Honest certification and the threat of capture

Strausz, Roland - 2004

This paper derives conditions under which reputation enables certifiers to resist capture. These conditions alone have strong implications for the industrial organization of certification markets: 1) Honest certification requires high prices that may even exceed the static monopoly price. 2)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343969

Platform standards, collusion and quality incentives

Salim, Claudia - 2009

This paper examines how quality incentives are related to the interoperability of competing platforms. Platforms choose whether to operate standardised or exclusively, prior to quality and subsequent price competition. We find that platforms choose a common standard if they can coordinate their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003848849

Competitive effects of vertical integration with downstream oligopsony and oligopoly

Loertscher, Simon; Reisinger, Markus - 2009

We analyze the competitive effects of backward vertical integration by a partially vertically integrated firm that competes with non-integrated firms both upstream and downstream. We show that vertical integration is procompetitive under fairly general conditions. It can be anticompetitive only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003909264

Collusion through joint R&D : an empirical assessment

Duso, Tomaso; Röller, Lars-Hendrik; Seldeslachts, Jo - 2010

This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We consider an oligopolistic setting … where firms enter in research joint ventures (RJVs) to lower production costs or coordinate on collusion in the product …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008823183