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Mergers between regulated firms with unknown efficiency gains
Fiocco, Raffaele; Guo, Gongyu - 2014
informational problems. We show that, as a consequence of this trade-off, more intense competition in unregulated segments of the … can lead to a softer merger policy when competition is weaker. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358241
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Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests
Wasser, Cédric - 2010
We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822063
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Bank competition : when is it good?
Hainz, Christa - 2008
The effects of bank competition and institutions on credit markets are usually studied separately although both factors … are interdependent. We study the effect of bank competition on the choice of contracts (screening versus collateralized … effects of bank competition on collateralization, access to finance, and social welfare depend on the institutional …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343924
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Exit options and the allocation of authority
Bester, Helmut; Krähmer, Daniel - 2013
We analyze the optimal allocation of authority in an organization whose members have conflicting preferences. One party has decision-relevant private information, and the party who obtains authority decides in a self-interested way. As a novel element in the literature on decision rights, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781380
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Who should pay for certification?
Stahl, Konrad; Strausz, Roland - 2010
Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer ' the seller ' follows from a non-trivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device, whence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003975228
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Two-sided certification : the market for rating agencies
Fasten, Erik R.; Hofmann, Dirk - 2010
Certifiers contribute to the sound functioning of markets by reducing a symmetric information. They, however, have been heavily criticized during the 2008-09 financial crisis. This paper investigates on which side of the market a monopolistic profit-maximizing certifier offers his service. If...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822613
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The strategic value of partial vertical integration
Fiocco, Raffaele - 2014
good price competition. Partial vertical integration entails an 'information vertical effect': the partial misalignment of … that reduce the hierarchy's profitability. This translates into an opposite 'competition horizontal effect': the partially … integrated hierarchy commits to a higher retail price than under full integration, which strategically relaxes competition. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010341920
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Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
Bester, Helmut; Krähmer, Daniel - 2008
This paper analyzes bilateral contracting in an environment with contractual incompleteness and asymmetric information. One party (the seller) makes an unverifiable quality choice and the other party (the buyer) has private information about its valuation. A simple exit option contract, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343931
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Black sheep and walls of silence
Mühlheuser, Gerd; Roider, Andreas - 2005 - Revised version: June 2005, First version: July 2004
In this paper we analyze the frequently observed phenomenon that (i) some members of a team ('black sheep') exhibit behavior disliked by other (honest) team members, who (ii) nevertheless refrain from reporting such misbehavior to the authorities (they set up a 'wall of silence'). Much cited...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371084
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Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship
Fiocco, Raffaele; Gilli, Mario - 2014
We investigate regulation as the outcome of a bargaining process between a regulator and a regulated firm. The regulator is required to monitor the firm's costs and reveal its information to a political principal (Congress). In this setting, we explore the scope for collusion between the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371305