Showing 1 - 10 of 75
-monotonic in the number of firms; 4) a regulator may demand inefficiently high levels of durability to prevent collusion. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343926
This paper derives conditions under which reputation enables certifiers to resist capture. These conditions alone have strong implications for the industrial organization of certification markets: 1) Honest certification requires high prices that may even exceed the static monopoly price. 2)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343969
enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366558
We model networks of relational (or implicit) contracts, exploring how sanctioning power and equilibrium conditions … larger networks. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366568
This paper develops a model of successive oligopolies with endogenous market entry, allowing for varying degrees of product differentiation and entry costs in both markets. Our analysis shows that the downstream conditions dominate the overall profitability of the two-tier structure while the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365845
We investigate the incentive for partial vertical integration, namely, partial ownership agreements between manufacturers and retailers, when the retailers are privately informed about their production costs and engage in differentiated good price competition. Partial vertical integration...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010341920
This paper studies cartels' strategic behavior in delaying leniency applications, a take-up decision that has been ignored in the previous literature. Using European Commission decisions issued over a 16-year span, we show, contrary to common beliefs and the existing literature, that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009685867
Colluding firms often exchange private information and make transfers within the cartels based on the information. Estimating the impact of such collusive practices" - known as the 'lysine strategy profile (LSP)" - on cartel duration is difficult because of endogeneity and omitted variable bias....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571067
setting, we explore the scope for collusion between the regulator and the firm, which results in the manipulation of the … regulator's report on the firm's costs to Congress. The firm's bene.t of collusion arises from the higher price the efficient … collusion only if the regulator's bargaining power in the regulatory relationship is relatively high. Then, we derive the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371305
This paper considers price competition in a duopoly with quality uncertainty. The established firm (the `incumbent') offers a quality that is publicly known; the other firm (the `entrant') offers a new good whose quality is not known by some consumers. The incumbent is fully informed about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781393