Showing 1 - 10 of 15
Business groups in emerging markets perform better than unaffiliated firms. One explanation is that business groups substitute some functions of missing institutions, for example, enforcing contracts. We investigate this by setting up a model where firms within the business group are connected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365879
A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003848830
The literature on R&D contests implicitly assumes that contestants submit their innovation regardless of its value. This ignores a potential adverse selection problem. The present paper analyzes the procurement of innovations when the procurer cannot commit to never bargain with innovators who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003848872
hazard. To model the procurer's roblem, we extend a standard sequential screening model to endogenous information acquisition … with moral hazard. The optimal contract displays systematic distortions in information acquisition. Due to a rent effect …, adverse selection induces too much information acquisition to prevent cost overruns and too little information acquisition to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935679
We consider procurement of an innovation from heterogeneous sellers. Innovations are random but depend on unobservable effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for admission to an innovation contest. After the contest,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935696
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950454
This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to restrict the number of bidders. The auctioneer can, however, offer a financial reward to be paid to every short-listed bidders as an indirect commitment device. Rewards for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571029
We study non-binding procurement auctions where both price and non-price characteristics of bidders matter for being awarded a contract. The outcome of such auctions critically depends on how information is distributed among bidders during the bidding process. As we show theoretically, whether...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358744
We consider the procurement of a complex, indivisible good when bid preparation is costly, assuming a population of heterogeneous contractors. Shortlisting is introduced to implement the optimal number of bidders, and we explore whether the procurer should reimburse the nonrecoverable cost of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383043
information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198514