Showing 1 - 10 of 73
Partnerships are the prevalent organizational form in many industries. Most partnerships share profits equally among the partners. Following Kandel and Lazear (1992) it is often argued that peer pressure mitigates the arising free-rider problem. This line of reasoning takes the equal sharing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365862
The paper studies procurement contracts with pre-project investigations in the presence of adverse selection and moral … related to false negatives. The optimal mechanism is a menu of option contracts that achieves the dual goal of providing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935679
This paper considers the canonical sequential screening model and shows that when the agent has an expost outside option, the principal does not benefit from eliciting the agent's information sequentially. Unlike in the standard model without expost outside options, the optimal contract is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009381855
overstated performance (leniency bias) may be the outcome of optimal contracts under informational asymmetries. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365849
In this paper, firms engage in rent seeking in order to be assigned a governmental contract. We analyze how a change in the contract length affects the firms' rent-seeking behavior. A longer contract leads to more rent seeking at a contract assignment stage, as the firms value the contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365859
. We assume that the principal uses both, formal contracts and informal agreements sustained by the value of future … relationships (relational contracts) as incentive device. It is found that the principal is less likely to delegate both tasks in a … dynamic setting than in a static one (where formal contracts are the only feasible incentive device), as handling one task …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365874
This paper studies the effectiveness of interim information in reducing inefficiencies in long term relationships. If the interim information is verifiable, it resolves all problems of asymmetric information. Under nonverifiability, the information alleviates the contracting problem only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343964
We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371071
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts … in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance … provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players. But …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371080
Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this … effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571567