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This paper views authority as the right to undertake decisions that impose externalities on other members of the organization. When only decision rights can be contractually assigned to one of the organization's stakeholders, the optimal assignment minimizes the resulting inefficiencies by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371079
veto power over any settlement. There is no depreciation during the bargaining process which involves signalling of private …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373492
We analyze the optimal allocation of authority in an organization whose members have conflicting preferences. One party has decision-relevant private information, and the party who obtains authority decides in a self-interested way. As a novel element in the literature on decision rights, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781380
We study the alternating-offer bargaining problem of sharing a common value pie under incomplete information on both sides and no depreciation between two identical players. We characterise the essentially unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game which turns out to be in gradually...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373493
We investigate regulation as the outcome of a bargaining process between a regulator and a regulated firm. The regulator is required to monitor the firm's costs and reveal its information to a political principal (Congress). In this setting, we explore the scope for collusion between the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371305
A party dissatisfied with the contractual performance of a counterparty is typically able to pursue a variety of legal recourses. Within this apparent variety lurk two fundamental alternatives. The aggrieved party may (i) 'affirm' the contract and seek money damages or specific performance; or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003909321
This paper views authority as the right to undertake decisions that have external effects on other members of the organization. Because of contractual incompleteness, monetary incentives are insufficient to internalize these effects in the decision maker's objective. The optimal assignment of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366572
This paper analyzes bilateral contracting in an environment with contractual incompleteness and asymmetric information. One party (the seller) makes an unverifiable quality choice and the other party (the buyer) has private information about its valuation. A simple exit option contract, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343931
We consider the case of an upstream seller who works to improve an asset that has been specialized to a downstream buyer's needs. The buyer then makes a take it or leave it offer to the seller about how the future surplus should be split. We assume that the seller from the outset has private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003909276
extent of their fairness concerns. Fairness is modelled as inequity aversion, where fair-minded workers suffer if their … colleagues get more income net of production costs. Screening workers with equal productivity but different fairness concerns is … the fraction of fair-minded workers. As a result, fairness might influence the employment contracts of all workers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366541