Showing 1 - 10 of 24
In many cultures and industries gifts are given in order to influence the recipient, often at the expense of a third party. Examples include business gifts of firms and lobbyists. In a series of experiments, we show that, even without incentive or in-formational effects, small gifts strongly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009685876
We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more … between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves as a legal substitute for corruption. Due to the obvious lack of field …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571021
We study the consequences of leniency - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law … enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366558
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We propose a model of corruption … profitable. We characterize equilibriumbidding in first- and second-price auctions, show how corruption distorts the allocation …, and why both the auctioneer and bidders may have a vested interest in maintaining corruption. Bid rigging is initiated by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010370526
In many developing countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption. This is surprising from a political economy … perspective, as the majority of people generally suffers from high corruption levels. We explain why citizens do not exert enough … political pressure to reduce corruption if financial institutions are missing. Our model is based on the fact that corrupt …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343937
We review different kinds of corruption that have been observed in procurement auctions and categorize them. We discuss … means to avoid corruption, by choice of preferable auction formats, or with the help of technological tools, such as secure … proposals, are particularly prone to corruption. We do not believe that it is possible to eradicate corruption altogether in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343955
This paper derives conditions under which reputation enables certifiers to resist capture. These conditions alone have strong implications for the industrial organization of certification markets: 1) Honest certification requires high prices that may even exceed the static monopoly price. 2)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343969
This paper studies the interaction of information disclosure and reputational concerns in certification markets. We argue that by revealing less precise information a certifier reduces the threat of capture. Opaque disclosure rules may reduce profits but also constrain feasible bribes. For large...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010408008
types of political risk, like expropriation, corruption and confiscatory taxation, and In our theoretical analysis we find …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366517
Development accounting literature usually attributes the observed cross-country variation in per capita income to differences in countries' factor endowments and total factor productivity (the Solow residual). While the former can be relatively straightforward interpreted and measured, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781364