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Kovenock, Daniel J.; Morath, Florian; Münster, Johannes - 2010

We study the incentives to share private information ahead of contests, such as markets with promotional competition, procurement contests, or R&D. We consider the cases where firms have (i) independent values and (ii) common values of winning the contest. In both cases, when decisions to share...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822740

Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests

Wasser, Cédric - 2010

We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822063

Rent-seeking contests under symmetric and asymmetric information

Wasser, Cédric - 2010

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950459

Information acquisition in conflicts

Morath, Florian; Münster, Johannes - 2010

This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. First, we characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two players with one-sided asymmetric information where one player has private information about his valuation. Then, we use ou rresults...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950481

Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication

Bester, Helmut; Strausz, Roland - 2004 - Version 1.3, December 2004

commitment. By allowing the principal to use general communication devices we overcome the literature's common, but overly … restrictive focus on one-shot, direct communication. In addition, general communication devices solve two fundamental problems of … the message spaces of the communication device. An example illustrates our arguments and the suboptimality of one …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361996

Promises and image concerns

Schütte, Miriam; Thoma, Carmen - 2014

According to several psychological and economic studies, non-binding communication can be an effective tool to increase …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010403536

A smooth, strategic communication

Deimen, Inga; Szalay, Dezsö - 2014

posterior means. The existence of smooth communication equilibria depends on the relative usefulness of the signal structure to … communication equilibrium. The quality of smooth equilibrium communication is entirely determined by the correlation of interests …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010408016

Delegation and communication

Arve, Malin; Honryo, Takakazu - 2015

the principal at the communication stage affects our results. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011345755

Balance of power and the propensity of conflict

Herbst, Luisa; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - 2015

We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576771

Jackpot justice : the value of inefficient litigation

Zhou, Jun - 2010

Litigation seems to be a Pareto-ineffcient outcome of pretrial bargaining; however, this paper shows that litigation can be the outcome of rational behavior by a litigant and her attorney. If the attorney has more information than his client concerning the characteristics of the lawsuit, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008823162

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