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Sequential bargaining with pure common values

Schweinzer, Paul - 2006

We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued object to one of two players in return for some payment among players. The players are asymmetrically informed about the object's value and have veto power over any settlement. There is no...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373492

Sequential bargaining with pure common values and incomplete information on both sides

Schweinzer, Paul - 2006

We study the alternating-offer bargaining problem of sharing a common value pie under incomplete information on both sides and no depreciation between two identical players. We characterise the essentially unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game which turns out to be in gradually...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373493

Contests for status

Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Shi, Xianwen - 2005

We study the optimal design of organizations under the assumption that agents in a contest care about their relative position. A judicious definition of status categories can be used by a principal in order to influence the agents' performance. We first consider a pure status case where there...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373503

A theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation

Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012 - Preliminary version: October 4, 2012

-term contracts. First, it explains why parties often abstain from writing a beneficial long-term contract or why some contracts …. Third, it shows that employment contracts can be strictly optimal even if parties are free to renegotiate. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009658107

Incomplete contracting, renegotiation, and expectation-based loss aversion

Herweg, Fabian; Karle, Heiko; Müller, Daniel - 2014

provides a rationale for 'employment contracts' in the absence of non-contractible investments. Moreover, in an extension with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010341925

Reference points in renegotiations : the role of contracts and competition

Bartling, Björn; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012

Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this … effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571567

Should you allow your agent to become your competitor? : on non-compete agreements in employment contracts

Kräkel, Matthias; Sliwka, Dirk - 2006

We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371071

Short-term or long-term contracts? : a rent-seeking perspective

Gürtler, Oliver - 2007

In this paper, firms engage in rent seeking in order to be assigned a governmental contract. We analyze how a change in the contract length affects the firms' rent-seeking behavior. A longer contract leads to more rent seeking at a contract assignment stage, as the firms value the contract...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365859

On delegation under relational contracts

Gürtler, Oliver - 2006

. We assume that the principal uses both, formal contracts and informal agreements sustained by the value of future … relationships (relational contracts) as incentive device. It is found that the principal is less likely to delegate both tasks in a … dynamic setting than in a static one (where formal contracts are the only feasible incentive device), as handling one task …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365874

Expectation damages, divisible contracts, and bilateral investment

Ohlendorf, Susanne - 2008

This paper examines the efficiency of expectation damages as a breach remedy in a bilateral trade setting with renegotiation and relationship-specific investment by the buyer and the seller. As demonstrated by Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), no contract that specifies only a fixed quantity and a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383019