Showing 1 - 10 of 167
Should contract design induce an agent to conduct a precontractual investigation even though, in any case, the agent … will become fully informed after the signing of the contract? This paper shows that imperfect investigations might be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198969
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer's problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010436207
be implemented even if the supervisor's preferences are unknown. The corresponding optimal contract is similar to what we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365849
with moral hazard. The optimal contract displays systematic distortions in information acquisition. Due to a rent effect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935679
contract that specifies only a fixed quantity and a fixed per-unit price can induce efficient investment if marginal cost is … renegotiation and relationship-specific investment by the buyer and the seller. As demonstrated by Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), no … risk of breaching, the first best becomes attainable with a simple price-quantity contract. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383019
A setting of reliance investments is explored where one of the parties to a contract obtains private information … difficult task to award expectation damages corrrectly to a party with private information who sufffers from breach of contract …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365891
limited liability, the optimal contract distinguishes only signals of good news and bad news of the agent's action. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010200421
We study the optimal hierarchical structure of an organization under limited commitment. The organization cannot make a long term commitment to wages and output levels, while it can commit to its hierarchical structure. We show that the optimal hierarchical structure is horizontal when it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003953962
We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198514
The paper extends the optimal delegation framework pioneered by Holmström (1977, 1984) to a dynamic environment where, at the outset, the agent privately knows his ability to interpret decision relevant private information received later on. We show that any mechanism can be implemented by a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198973