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Complementary patents and market structure
Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2009 - This version: August 19, 2009
discourages entry and reduces innovation incentives, while horizontal integration always benefits from entry and innovation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003909249
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Innovation strategies and stock price informativeness
Ding, Haina - 2015
This paper models the interactions among technological innovation, product market competition and information leakage …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010480936
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Overconfidence and managers' responsibility hoarding
Nieken, Petra; Sadrieh, Abdolkarim; Zhou, Nannan - 2011
Overconfidence is a well-established behavioral phenomenon that involves an overestimation of own capabilities. We introduce a model, in which managers and agents exert effort in a joint production, after the manager decides on the allocation of the tasks. A rational manager tends to delegate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571367
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Innovation contests with entry auction
Giebe, Thomas - 2010
We consider procurement of an innovation from heterogeneous sellers. Innovations are random but depend on unobservable … admission to an innovation contest. After the contest, an innovation is procured employing either a fixed prize or a first …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935696
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On competition and the strategic management of intellectual property in oligopoly
Jansen, Jos - 2010
An innovative firm with private information about its indivisible process innovation chooses strategically whether to … the size of the innovation, and affects the incentives in the product market. A Cournot competitor tends to patent big … substitutability increases the incentives to patent the innovation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822610
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Collusion through joint R&D : an empirical assessment
Duso, Tomaso; Röller, Lars-Hendrik; Seldeslachts, Jo - 2010
This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We consider an oligopolistic setting where firms enter in research joint ventures (RJVs) to lower production costs or coordinate on collusion in the product market. We show that a sufficient condition for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008823183
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Complementary patents and market structure
Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2008
complements problem but not the double mark-up problem. Vertical integration discourages entry and reduces innovation incentives …, while horizontal integration always encourages entry and innovation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343929
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Good news and bad news in subjective performance evaluation
Budde, Jörg - 2013
Earlier studies show that contracts under subjective performance evaluation are dichotomous and punish only worst performance. I show that with limited liability payments need not be binary. More importantly, if the agent earns a rent from limited liability, the optimal contract distinguishes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010200421
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On delegation under relational contracts
Gürtler, Oliver - 2006
In this paper, a principal's decision between delegating two tasks or handling one of the two tasks herself is analyzed. We assume that the principal uses both, formal contracts and informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships (relational contracts) as incentive device. It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365874
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Veto-based delegation
Mylovanov, Tymofiy - 2005 - First version: October 2004, this version: January 2005
In a principal-agent model with hidden information and no monetary transfers, I establish the Veto-Power Principle: any incentive-compatible outcome can be implemented through veto-based delegation with an endogenously chosen default decision. This result demonstrates the exact nature of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373505