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Firm size, economic situation and influence activities
Kräkel, Matthias - 2006
This paper discusses the optimal firm size in the presence of influence activities, and the level of individual rent-seeking dependent on the economic situation of the firm. Since firm size has a discouraging effect on the level of individual rent-seeking but also a quantity effect as the number...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383042
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Optimal ownership structures in the presence of investment signals
Gürtler, Oliver - 2006
. Optimal incentive strength, that is, the weight that a signal is optimally given in a wage contract, depends on two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365870
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On the adverse selection of organizations
Kräkel, Matthias - 2006
According to New Institutional Economics, two or more individuals will found an organization, if it leads to a benefit compared to market allocation. A natural consequence will then be internal rent seeking. We discuss the interrelation between profits, rent seeking and the foundation of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366531
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Fairness and contract design
Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2005 - This version: November 5, 2005
, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness and incentives. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371080
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Contractual incentive provision and commitment in rent-seeking contests
Gürtler, Oliver - 2006
In this paper, we consider a symmetric rent-seeking contest, where employees lobby for a governmental contract on … behalf of firms. The only verifiable information is which firm is assigned the contract. We derive the optimal wage contracts … of the employees and analyze, whether commitment by determining the wage contract prior to the competitor is profitable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343953
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Interim information in long term contracts
Strausz, Roland - 2005
principle, the optimal contract under non-verifiability is derived by employing the theory of communication equilibrium. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343964
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Optimal contracts for lenient supervisors
Giebe, Thomas; Gürtler, Oliver - 2008
be implemented even if the supervisor's preferences are unknown. The corresponding optimal contract is similar to what we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365849
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On delegation under relational contracts
Gürtler, Oliver - 2006
In this paper, a principal's decision between delegating two tasks or handling one of the two tasks herself is analyzed. We assume that the principal uses both, formal contracts and informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships (relational contracts) as incentive device. It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365874
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Mediation in situations of conflict and limited commitment
Mitusch, Kay; Strausz, Roland - 2004
We study the reasons and conditions under which mediation is beneficial when a principal needs information from an agent to implement an action. Assuming a strong form of limited commitment, the principal may employ a mediator who gathers information and makes non-binding proposals. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366573
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Bonus pools and the informativeness principle
Imhof, Lorens; Kräkel, Matthias - 2013
further bene.t from combining worker compensation via a bonus-pool contract and relative performance evaluation. Such …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198505