This paper characterizes the class of communication networks for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive-compatible social choice function is (partially) implementable. Among others, in environments with either common and independent beliefs and private values or a bad...

A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if at any preference profile, the set of all pure and mixed Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f-optimal alternatives at that preference profile. This definition generalizes Maskin's definition of...

This note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents. We postulate the concept of "-minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are Maskin...

This paper investigates the relation between cognitive abilities and behavior in strategic-form games with the help of a novel experiment. The design allows us first to measure the cognitive abilities of subjects without confound and then to evaluate their impact on behavior in strategic-from...

This paper introduces the concept of ordient for binary relations (preferences), a relative of the concept of gradient for functions (utilities). The main motivation for this study is to replace the ordering at the center stage of economic analysis, rather than its representation, if it exists....