On a heterogeneous experimental oligopoly market, sellers choose a price, specify a set-valued prior-free conjecture about the others' behavior, and form their own profit-aspiration for each element of their conjecture. We formally define the concepts of satisficing and prior-free optimality and...

Though the social choice of social institutions or social results is impossible there is, strictly speaking, no social choice individual evaluations of social institutions or results trivially are possible. Such individual evaluations can be deemed liberal either because they emphasize political...

We study ultimatum and dictator experiments where the first mover chooses the amount of money to be distributed between the players within a given interval, knowing that her own share is fixed. Thus, the first mover is faced with scarcity, but not with the typical trade-off between her own and...

This paper estimates a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for the European Monetary Union by using Bayesian techniques. A salient feature of the model is an extension of the typically postulated quadratic cost structure for the monopolistic choice of price variables. As shown in...

This paper shows the inappropriatedness of approximation procedures for welfare rankings across suboptimal policy strategies. On the grounds of a simple general equilibrium model, we find that even commonly accepted techniques are not suitable to achieve accurate welfare orderings. This result...