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Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces

Oechssler, Joerg; Riedel, Frank - 1998

are well defined for infinite strategy spaces. Furthermore, we provide conditions for the stability of rest points … Bertrand oligopoly games, and mixed strategies. -- replicator dynamics ; evolutionary stability ; continuous strategy spaces …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578001

Through trial & error to collusion

Huck, Steffen; Oechssler, Joerg; Normann, Hans-Theo - 1999

In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580461

The East End, the West End, and King’s Cross : on clustering in the four-player hotelling game

Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Vriend, Nicolaas J. - 2000

This article investigates whether decision makers intuitively optimize close to the normative prediction in entrepreneurial decision situations where their time must be allocated between a wage job and a newly formed venture. We offer an analytical model based on maximizing expected utility, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583426

Absent–minded drivers in the lab : testing Gilboa’s model

Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland - 2000

This note contributes to the discussion of decision problems with imperfect recall from an empirical point of view. We argue that, using standard methods of experimental economics, it is impossible to induce (or control for) absent-mindedness of subjects. Nevertheless, it is possible to test...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583877

Strategic delegation in experimental markets

Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2000

In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583883

On the dynamic foundation of evolutionary stability in continuous models

Oechssler, Joerg; Riedel, Frank - 2000

We show in this paper that none of the existing static evolutionary stability concepts (ESS, CSS, uninvadability, NIS …) is sufficient to guarantee dynamic stability in the weak topology with respect to standard evolutionary dynamics if the …. Evolutionary robustness ensures dynamic stability for replicator dynamics in doubly symmetric games. -- replicator dynamics …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612050

Loss of commitment? : an evolutionary analysis of Bagwell's example

Oechssler, Joerg; Schlag, Karl H. - 1997

In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009657122