Relying on the specific example of ultimatum bargaining experiments this paperexplores the possible role of empirical knowledge of behavioural “norm(ative)facts” within the search for (W)RE – (Wide) Reflective Equilibria on normativeissues. Assuming that “pro-social” behaviour...

Dynamics of compliance, depending on audit probability, sanctions, and the time lagbetween audits, are investigated in a tax experiment. Compliance varied significantlyover time: it decreased immediately after an audit and increased afterwards, especially if audits were frequent and sanctions high.

In a cascade experiment subjects are confronted with artificial predecessors prdecting in line with the BHW model (Bikhchandandi, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992). Using the BDM mechanism we study subjects' probability assignments based on price limits for participating in the prediction game. We...