This paper theoretically assesses the role that uncertainty plays in the intensity of conflicts. The standard two-player rent-seeking contest model (Tullock, 1980) is extended to allow for privately known subjective values of the prize. The conflict is modeled as a Bayesian game on which each...

Enduring violent conflict is the flip side of the coin of a weak state. In this article, I propose some political economy underpinnings for the persistence of conflict (and the weak state). Focusing on the case of Colombia, I discuss three broad sets of mechanisms that are also relevant...

We explore the role of unfairly resolved land conflicts on the long-run dynamics of Colombia's war. We claimed that inadequately or unfairly resolved land conflicts can explain not only the emergence of rebel groups but also their repertoires and targets of violence—notably forced...

This paper studies the effect of internal conflict on local fiscal capacity using evidence from Colombia’s political conflict in the mid-20th century, better known as La Violencia. Following a difference-in-differences strategy, I find that internal conflict has negative long-term consequences...