We prove the stability of equilibrium in a completely decentralized Walrasian general equilibrium economy in which prices are fully controlled by economic agents, with production and trade occuring out of equilibrium.

We present a mathematical model for the analysis of the bargaining games based on private prices used by Gintis to simulate the dynamics of prices in exchange economies, see [Gintis 2007]. We then characterize, in the Scarf economy, a class of dynamics for which the Walrasian equilibrium is the...

Within a standard framework à la Arrow-Debreu, we investigate the dynamics emerging from the interactions of heterogeneous households and firms that are adaptive price setters and financially constrained. We show that depending on the stringency of the financial constraints the model can settle...

We prove the stability of equilibrium in a completely decentralized Walrasian general equilibrium economy in which prices are fully controlled by economic agents, with production and trade occuring out of equilibrium.

We present a mathematical model for the analysis of the bargaining games based on private prices used by Gintis to simulate the dynamics of prices in exchange economies, see [Gintis 2007]. We then characterize, in the Scarf economy, a class of dynamics for which the Walrasian equilibrium is the...