Showing 1 - 10 of 21
Despite the large number of its references, this paper is less a survey than a systematic exposition, in an unifying framework and assuming convexity as well on the consumption side as on the production side, of the different equilibrium concepts elaborated for studying provision of public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012498
Focusing on their analysis of the optimal public goods provision problem, this paper follows the parallel development of equilibrium models and mechanism design after the accomodation of Samuelson's definition of collective goods to the general equilibrium framework. Both paradigms lead to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727371
Focussing on their analysis of the optimal public goods provision problem, this paper follows the parallel development of equilibrium models and mechanism design after the accommodation of Samuelson's definition of collective goods to the general equilibrium framework. Both paradigms lead to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012508
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014253545
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013543855
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012668192
We study the structure of unstable local effectivity functions defined for n players and p alternatives. A stability index based on the notion of cycle is introduced. In the particular case of simple games, the stability index is closely related to the Nakamura Number. In general it may be any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005025524
An element of the possibly unbounded core of a cooperative game with precedence constraints belongs to its bounded core … if any transfer to a player from any of her subordinates results in payoffs outside the core. The bounded core is the … union of all bounded faces of the core, it is nonempty if the core is nonempty, and it is a continuous correspondence on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493567
In cooperative games, the core is one of the most popular solution concept since it ensures coalitional rationality …. For non-balanced games however, the core is empty, and other solution concepts have to be found. We propose the use of … particular, the k-additive core proposed by Grabisch and Miranda is a general solution preserving coalitional rationality which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010641780
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013332351