We use a simple model to study whether private payment systems based on bank deposits can provide the optimal level of safety. In the model, bank deposits backed by projects are subject to default risk that can be mitigated by a depositor's ex ante and ex post monitoring. Safe payment...

Should a central bank digital currency (CBDC) be issued? Should its design be cash- or depositlike? To answer these questions, we theoretically and quantitatively assess the effects of a CBDC on consumption, banking and welfare. Our model introduces new general equilibrium linkages across...

This paper builds a model with imperfect competition in the banking sector. In the model, banks issue deposits and make loans, and deposits can be used as payment instruments by households. We use the model to assess the general equilibrium effects of introducing a central bank digital currency...

Many central banks are contemplating whether to issue a central bank digital currency (CDBC). CDBC has certain potential benefits, including the possibility that it can bear interest. However, using CBDC is costly for agents, perhaps because they lose their anonymity when using CBDC instead of...

How does the transmission of monetary policy change when a central bank digital currency (CBDC) is introduced in the economy? Do aspects of CBDC design, such as how substitutable it is with bank deposits and whether it is interest bearing, matter? We study these questions in a general...