This paper investigates both the magnitude and the drivers of bank window dressing behaviour in euro-denominated repo markets. Using a confidential transaction-level data set, our analysis illustrates that banks engineer an economically sizeable contraction in their repo transactions around...

This paper investigates both the magnitude and the drivers of bank window dressing behaviour in euro-denominated repo markets. Using a confidential transaction-level data set, our analysis illustrates that banks engineer an economically sizeable contraction in their repo transactions around...

One important source of systemic risk can arise from asset commonality among financial institutions. This indirect interconnection may occur when financial institutions invest in similar or correlated assets and it is also described as overlapping portfolios. In this paper, we propose a new...

One important source of systemic risk can arise from asset commonality among financial institutions. This indirect interconnection may occur when financial institutions invest in similar or correlated assets and is also described as overlapping portfolios. In this work, we propose a...

We analyze jointly optimal carbon pricing and leverage regulation in a model with financial constraints and endogenous climate-related transition and physical risks. The socially optimal emissions tax is below the Pigouvian benchmark (equal to the direct social cost of emissions) when emissions...

We analyze jointly optimal carbon pricing and leverage regulation in a model with financial constraints and endogenous climate-related transition and physical risks. The socially optimal emissions tax is below the Pigouvian benchmark (equal to the direct social cost of emissions) when emissions...

Both in the United States and in the Euro area, bank supervision is the joint responsibility of local and central/federal supervisors. I study how such a system can optimally balance the lower inspection costs of local supervisors with the ability of the central level to internalize cross-border...

Sector-specific macroprudential regulations can increase the riskiness of credit to other sectors. First, using cross-country bank-level data we find that after a tightening of household-specific macroprudential policy during a credit expansion, banks with larger portfolios of residential...

Both in the United States and in the Euro area, bank supervision is the joint responsibility of local and central/federal supervisors. I study how such a system can optimally balance the lower inspection costs of local supervisors with the ability of the central level to internalize cross-border...

Sector-specific macroprudential regulations can increase the riskiness of credit to other sec-tors. First, using cross-country bank-level data we find that after a tightening of household-specific macroprudential policy during a credit expansion, banks with larger portfolios of residential...