We study the role of high-frequency trading in a dynamic limit order market. Being fast is valuable because it enables traders to revise outstanding limit orders upon news arrivals when interacting with slow market participants. On the one hand, the existence of fast traders can help to reduce...

We study empirically how competition among high-frequency traders (HFTs) affects their trading behavior and market quality. Our analysis exploits a unique dataset, which allows us to compare environments with and without high-frequency competition, and contains an exogenous event - a tick size...

We show that limited dealer participation in the market, coupled with an informational friction resulting from high frequency trading, can induce demand for liquidity to be upward sloping and strategic complementarities in traders' liquidity consumption decisions traders demand more liquidity...

This paper contributes to the existing literature on central bank repo auctions. It is based on a structural econometric approach, whereby the primitives of bidding behavior (individual bid schedules and bid-shading components) are directly estimated. With the estimated parameters we calibrate a...

This paper investigates the relationship between central bank (reverse) auctions and bill market liquidity. The analysis includes data on the purchases of bills in the auctions by the Dutch Central Bank under the European Central Bank’s Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP). The results...

Earlier research has shown that euro-area primary public debt markets affect secondary markets. We find that more successful auctions of euro area public debt, as captured by higher bid-to-cover ratios, lead to lower secondary-market yields following the auctions. This effect is stronger when...

We propose a new model of trading in OTC markets. Dealers accumulate inventories by trading with end-investors and trade among each other to reduce their inventory holding costs. Core dealers use a more efficient trading technology than peripheral dealers, who are heterogeneously connected to...

We show that the liquidation value of collateral depends on who is pledging it. We employ transaction-level data on overnight repurchase agreements (repo) and loan-level credit registry data on corporate loans. We find that borrowers on the repo market pay a 2.6 basis points rate premium when...