We examine the within-firm resource allocation and restructuring outcomes at firms violating debt covenants. Using establishment-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we find that covenant violations are followed by reductions in employment, investment, and more frequent establishment closures...

Using a large panel of firms across the world from 1991-2006, we show that the median foreign firm has lower idiosyncratic risk than a comparable U.S. firm. Country characteristics help explain variation in the level of idiosyncratic risk, but less so than firm characteristics. Idiosyncratic...

The paper analyzes 362 European activist interventions by hedge funds, focus funds and other activist investors from 2000 to 2008. The sample includes both public and private interventions. The private interventions are based upon proprietary data collected from five activist funds. For public...

Using a sample of voting turnouts of annual general meetings of European companies, we document that shareholder voting turnouts are significantly different according to the ownership structure of the company. Different types of shareholder classes show different voting engagements according to...

This paper determines optimal capital structure and value of Holding-Subsidiary structures (HS), when there is a trade-off between bankruptcy costs and taxation. HS have higher firm value than their stand alone counterparts, as the holding provides a guarantee to its subsidiary's lenders which...

Commission Regulation (EC) No 2273/2003 regulates the price stabilization activities for equity initial public offerings (IPOs) in Europe as a form of permitted market manipulation. To test the actual practices and effects of stabilization we empirically analyze the support provided by the...

Family firms are a widespread control structure in most countries, especially among smaller firms. A vast literature addresses the question of whether they are performing better or worse than comparable non family firms, with not entirely conclusive results. Here we take a different, indirect...