This paper investigates Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) deregistrations by foreign firms from the time the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was passed in 2002 through 2008. We test two theories, the bonding theory and the loss of competitiveness theory, to understand why foreign firms leave...

Using unusually rich and accurate data from Oslo Stock Exchange firms, we find that corporate governance matters for economic performance, that insider ownership matters the most, that outside ownership concentration destroys market value, that direct ownership is superior to indirect, and that...

This paper examines the hypothesis that firms in competitive industries should benefit relatively less from good governance, while firms in non-competitive industries - where lack of competitive pressure fails to enforce discipline on managers - should benefit relatively more. Whether we look at...

We evaluate the impact of firm-level corporate governance provisions on the valuation of firms in a large cross-section of countries. Unlike previous work, we differentiate between minimally accepted governance attributes that are satisfied by all firms in a given country and governance...

We estimate accelerator-cash flow models for 25,000 firms in 15 transition economies over the period 1993-2003, and find that (1) investment-cash flow sensitivities decline over transition years, which we attribute to a decreasing of asymmetric information and managerial discretion as capital...

This study investigates the employment consequences of private equity acquisitions, in particular institutional buy-outs (IBOs), in the UK. It involves a pre- and post-acquisition analysis of employment and performance characteristics for a sample of acquired firms and a matched sample of...

In family firms, the succession of controlling equity stake to next generation is an issue of paramount importance. This, however, can be a major challenge in the presence of heavy inheritance or gift tax burden (high tax rate and absence of tax-saving vehicles, such as trusts or foundations)...

This paper uses managerial control rights data for over 5000 firms from 31 countries to examine the net costs and benefits of cash holdings. We find that when external country-level shareholder protection is weak, firm values are lower when controlling managers hold more cash. Further, when...

The paper examines the payout policy of UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange during the 1990s. We complement the existing payout literature studies by analyzing jointly the trends in dividends and share repurchases. Unlike in the US, we find that, in the UK, firms do not demonstrate a...

We investigate the investment-cash flow sensitivity of a large sample of the UK listed firms and confirm that investment is strongly cash flow-sensitive. Is this suboptimal investment policy the result of agency problems when managers with high discretion overinvest, or of asymmetric information...