In family firms, the succession of controlling equity stake to next generation is an issue of paramount importance. This, however, can be a major challenge in the presence of heavy inheritance or gift tax burden (high tax rate and absence of tax-saving vehicles, such as trusts or foundations)...

Previous research initiated by Claessens et al. (2002) has established a value discount of disproportional ownership structures. Due to omitted variables problems it is difficult to provide a causal interpretation of these findings. We provide a thorough analysis of this value discount in a...

Extensive research finds that shareholder and CEO preferences affect demand for director services. We find a large body of evidence that independent director reputation incentives influence the supply of director services. These reputation incentives vary across firms and over time,...

I review recent takeover research which advances our understanding of "who buys who" in the drive for productive efficiency. This research provides detailed information on text-based definitions of product market links between bidders and targets, the role of the supply chain and industrial...

This paper examines the link between firm performance, board structure and top executive pay. We use a panel of firms from the Portuguese Stock Market, where the institutional context differs markedly from the U.K. and U.S., but is very similar to most other European countries. The standard...

This paper reopens the debate on why firms pay lower dividends in the stakeholder-oriented governance regimes of Continental Europe than in the market-oriented Anglo-American world. Previous studies observe the concentrated ownership structures of Continental European firms, and infer that in...

The paper examines the payout policy of UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange during the 1990s. We complement the existing payout literature studies by analyzing jointly the trends in dividends and share repurchases. Unlike in the US, we find that, in the UK, firms do not demonstrate a...

From 1988 to 2003, the average change in managerial ownership is significantly negative every year for American firms. We find that managers are more likely to significantly decrease their ownership when their firms are performing well and more likely to increase their ownership when their firms...

In Italy, as in many other European countries, listed firms have gone dark through controlling shareholder-initiated tender offers. We find that the presence of institutional investors, especially when foreign, helps minority shareholders receive a higher takeover premium and reduces the...

This paper studies the two potentially contrasting effects on IPO pricing and post-IPO operating performance of family ties as well as social ties the top management has with board members. While family ties may solve manager-owner conflicts of interests, they may also give rise to...