As documented by empirical research, tax compliance costs are a considerable burden for private businesses. However, cost estimates may be biased due to survey non-response and questionnaire framing effects. This paper investigates the impact of both aspects on cost estimates. We do not find...

Wir vergleichen den Einfluss von zwei unterschiedlichen steuerpolitischen Strategien - eine dauerhafte Senkung der Unternehmenssteuerbelastung (etwa des Körperschaftsteuersatzes) und temporäre steuerliche Investitionsanreize (etwa durch Sonderabschreibungen). Dabei greifen wir sowohl auf die...

Our paper provides a comprehensive report of empirical research on tax compliance costs. Compared to previous reviews, our focus is on average costs for sub-groups (individual taxpayers, small businesses, large businesses) and the composition of the cost burden with regards to different cost...

Wir vergleichen den Einfluss von zwei unterschiedlichen steuerpolitischen Strategien - einer dauerhaften Senkung der Unternehmenssteuerbelastung (etwa durch Senkung des Körperschaftsteuersatzes) und temporärer steuerlicher Investitionsanreize (etwa über Sonderabschreibungen). Dabei greifen...

Credence goods markets - like for health care or repair services - with their informational asymmetries between sellers and customers are prone to fraudulent behavior of sellers and resulting market inefficiencies. We present the first model that considers both diagnostic uncertainty of sellers...

Credence goods markets are prone to fraudulent behavior and market inefficiencies due to informational asymmetries between sellers and customers. We examine experimentally the effects of diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage on the information acquisition and provision decisions by...

In markets for credence goods - such as health care or repair services - fraudulent behavior by better informed experts is a common problem. Our model studies how four common features shape experts' provision behavior in credence goods markets: (i) diagnostic uncertainty of experts; (ii)...