Showing 1 - 8 of 8
, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with endogenous prices. We identify heterogeneous distributional preferences … as the main cause and design a parsimonious experiment with exogenous prices that allows classifying experts as either …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294825
determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields … efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294835
This paper studies the incentives for credence goods experts to invest effort in diagnosis if effort is both costly and … effort and the credence characteristic of the good induces experts to choose incentive compatible tariff structures. This … makes them vulnerable to competition by discounters. We explore the conditions under which honestly diagnosing experts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293427
between experts and consumers. The functioning of the market heavily relies on trust on the side of the consumer as well as … behavior of experts, however, is not significantly influenced by the health care framing, nor by the subject pool. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012614675
Evidence on behavior of experts in credence goods markets raises an important causality issue: Do "fair prices" induce … "good behavior", or do "good experts" post "fair prices"? To answer this question we propose and test a model with three … selection and fixed effects regressions support the model's predictions and show that causality goes from good experts to fair …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312241
In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market efficiency and reduce the informational disadvantage of buyers. Feedback mechanisms might work because of self-selection of more trustworthy sellers into markets with such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013468203
Firms have incentives to influence regulators' decisions. In a dynamic setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the revolving-door channel) than through a hidden payment (i.e., a bribe). This is because the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012609021
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to make early...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009785461