We show, that Strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quasiperfect in every extensive form (with that normal form). Thus, properness requires optimality along a sequence of suppol ting trembles, while sequentiality only requires optimality in the limit. A...

This paper develops an approach to equilibrium selection in game theory based on studying the learning process through which equilibrium is achieved. The differential equations derived frommodels of interactive learn-ing typically have stationary states that are not isolated. Instead, Nash...

This paper develops an approach to equilibrium selection in game theory based on studying the equilibriating process through which equilibrium is achieved. The differential equations derived from models of interactive learning typically have stationary states that are not isolated. Instead, Nash...

This paper characterizes modified evolutiona.rily stable strategies (MESSes) in Rubinstein's alternatingoffers, infinite- horizon bargaining game. The MESS concept modifies the idea of an neutrally stable strategy by favoring a simple strategy over a more complex strategy when both yield the...

This paper studies a population of agents, each of whom can be either an Altruist or an Egoist. Altruists confer benefits on others at a cost to themselves. Altruism is thus a strictly dominated strategy and cannot survive if agents are rational best-responders. We assume that agents choose...

This paper examines an evolutionary model in which the primary source of noise that moves the model between equilibria is not arbitrarily improbvable mutations but mistakes in learning. We model strategy selection as a birth-death process, allowing us to and a simple, closed-form solution for...

This paper characterizes modified evolutionarily stable strategies (messes) in Rubinstein's alternating-offers, infinite-horizon bargaining game. The mess concept modifies the idea of a neutrally stable strategy by favoring a simple strategy over a more complex strategy when both yield the same...