Showing 1 - 10 of 11
This paper develops an approach to equilibrium selection in game theory based on studying the learning process through which equilibrium is achieved. The differential equations derived frommodels of interactive learn-ing typically have stationary states that are not isolated. Instead, Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005196769
The Paradox of the Absent-Minded Driver is used in the literature to draw attention to the inadequacy of Savage's theory of subjective probability when its underlying epistomological assumptions fail to be satisfied. This note suggests that the paradox is less telling when the uncertainties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005769612
In 1987, I wrote a paper (Binmore [14]) that questioned the rationality of the backward induction principle in finite games of perfect information. Since that time, a small literature has grown up in which Antonelli and Bicchieri [1], Ben-Porath [9], Bicchieri [10,11], Bonanno [21,22], Pettit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005417203
This paper develops an approach to equilibrium selection in game theory based on studying the equilibriating process through which equilibrium is achieved. The differential equations derived from models of interactive learning typically have stationary states that are not isolated. Instead, Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636434
In 1987, I wrote a paper that questioned the rationality of the backward induction principle in finite games of perfect information. Since that time, a small literature has grown up in which Antonelli and Bicchieri , Ben-Porath, Bicchieri, Bonanno, Pettit and Sugden [28], Reny [30], Samet [32],...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636439
This paper characterizes modified evolutiona.rily stable strategies (MESSes) in Rubinstein's alternatingoffers, infinite- horizon bargaining game. The MESS concept modifies the idea of an neutrally stable strategy by favoring a simple strategy over a more complex strategy when both yield the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636443
This paper suggests that rights are best seen as being part of the description of a social state rather than as constituents of the mechanism by means of which society selects a social state. A theory of this kind is outlined in which a social state is modeled as an equilibrium in the game of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636447
Although the burgeoning discipline of welfare economics is based on es-sentially utilititarian principles, the foundations of utilitarianism have received little attention in recent years. This paper seeks to reopen the debate by drawing a distinction between Harsanyi's two defences of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636456
This paper examines an evolutionary model in which the primary source of noise that moves the model between equilibria is not arbitrarily improbvable mutations but mistakes in learning. We model strategy selection as a birth-death process, allowing us to and a simple, closed-form solution for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636457
This paper characterizes modified evolutionarily stable strategies (messes) in Rubinstein's alternating-offers, infinite-horizon bargaining game. The mess concept modifies the idea of a neutrally stable strategy by favoring a simple strategy over a more complex strategy when both yield the same...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636458