This paper examines how capital tax competition affects jurisdiction formation. We describe a locational model of public goods provision, where jurisdictions are represented by coalitions of consumers with similar tastes, and where the levels of taxation and local public goods provision within...

This paper investigates whether tax competition can survive under tax coordination, when information is private or nonverifiable. We focus on a two-jurisdiction model where capital can move across jurisdictions, and where the two jurisdictions have different public good requirements, but are...

This paper examines how capital tax competition affects jurisdiction formation. We describe a locational model of public goods provision, where jurisdictions are represented by coalitions of consumers with similar tastes, and where the levels of taxation and local public goods provision within...

This paper investigates whether it is possible to find Pareto-improving commodity tax reforms that harmonise taxes between two countries when governments supply public goods and thus have revenue requirements. It is shown that, with two goods, and starting from Nash equilibrium taxes, any...

This paper presents a two-party model of fiscal and debt policy which; (i) explicitly models the partisan, stabilisation, and (to some extent) survival motives of politicians; (ii) has predictions that are largely consistent with existing empirical finding about partisan and electoral effects in...

This paper investigates the proposition that a progressive tax system contributes to wage moderation. We continue the work of Lockwood and Manning (1993), who considered macro date for the UK, by looking at Danish wage equations for different earnings levels. Our main conclusions are that...