This paper shows that asynchronicity of moves can lead to a unique prediction in coordination games, in an infinite-horizon setting, under certain conditions on off-equilibrium payoffs. In two-player games we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for play ultimately being absorbed in the...

In the context of repeated public good contribution games, we experimentally investigate the impact of democratic punishment, when members of a group decide by majority voting whether to inflict punishment on another member, relative to individual peer-to-peer punishment. Democratic punishment...

This paper investigates stable and efficient networks in the context of risk sharing, when it is costly to establish and maintain relationships that facilitate risk sharing. We find a novel trade-off between efficiency and equality: The most stable efficient networks also generate the most...

In many contracting settings, actions costly to one party but with no direct benefits to the other (money-burning) may be part of the explicit or implicit contract. A leading example is bureaucratic procedures in an employer-employee relationship. We study a model of delegation with an informed...

Supplementary Appendix to "Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives."The paper "Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives" to which these Appendices apply is available at the following URL: "http://ssrn.com/abstract=2700821" http://ssrn.com/abstract=2700821

We investigate information aggregation and competition in a delegationframework. An uninformed principal is unable to perform a task herself andmust choose between one of two biased and imperfectly informed experts. Inthe focal equilibrium, experts exaggerate their biases, anticipating...

This supplement provides welfare results not contained in the main text and a proof of Lemma A.1. For small bonuses, a mixed equilibrium exists if and only if a max equilibrium exists; if so, it is unique. For large bonuses, we find a unique candidate for mixed equilibrium and show that mixed...