This paper examines the effects of different corporate governance mechanisms on the cost of debt for large European firms and documents a novel interaction effect between shareholder rights and disclosure. Improved disclosure leads to a lower credit spread only if shareholder rights are low. A...

Over the last decade, the going private market has experienced a considerable boom in size and also has become more interesting for private equity investors that are looking to partner with incumbent management. This offers managers the choice to take the firm private themselves in a traditional...

We examine the relation between the quality of corporate governance and the value of excess cash for large European firms (FTSEurofirst 300 Index). We use Deminor ratings for Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board as proxies for the quality of corporate governance. We find...

In this paper we present the results of an international survey among 313 CFOs on capital budgeting, cost of capital, capital structure, and corporate governance. We extend previous results of Graham and Harvey (2001) by broadening their sample internationally, by including corporate governance,...

We examine 865 acquisitions by Dutch industrial firms over the period 1993–2004. Theoretical work based on principal–agent problems predicts that managers of exchange-listed corporations may pursue acquisitions even when these do not add value for the shareholders. Corporate governance...

We study annual general meetings of shareholders in the Netherlands. The Dutch corporate governance system is characterized by relatively concentrated shareholdings and large stakes owned by pension funds, banks and insurance companies. The legal protection of shareholders is poor due to...

This paper assesses the effectiveness of self-regulation to promote investor interests. The Netherlands provides an excellent opportunity to gather such evidence for two reasons. First, characteristics of the Dutch corporate governance structure have made it the recent focus of attention by the...

Royal Ahold (Koninklijke Ahold NV) was one of the major success stories in the 1990s and is one of the major failures in corporate governance, suffering a complete meltdown in 2003. This clinical study analyzes Ahold’s growth strategy through acquisitions and isolates the cause of the failed...

Large institutional investors allocate their funds over a number of classes (e.g. equity, fixed income and real estate), various geographical regions and different industries. In practice, these allocation decisions are usually made in a hierarchical (top-down), consecutive way. At the higher...

The present paper examines firm size effects on the decision of venture capital firms to participate in a venture capital investment syndication network. The authors submit that firm size effects in venture capital syndication are dependent on resource acquisition motives and transaction cost...