Showing 1 - 10 of 128
interim‐optimal conditional on available information. We investigate how such intermediaries communicate with the parties …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806593
I study how the arrival of new private information affects bargaining outcomes. A seller makes offers to a buyer. The …-best is implementable via a mechanism, whereas all equilibrium outcomes of the bargaining game are inefficient. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014325243
A two-person infinite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have either of two discount factors, has a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673276
I consider multi-round cheap talk communication environments in which, after a lie, the informed party has no memory of the content of the lie. I characterize the equilibria with forgetful liars in such settings assuming that a liar's expectation about his past lie coincides with the equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587426
We analyze information design games between two designers with opposite preferences and a single agent. Before the … agent makes a decision, designers repeatedly disclose public information about persistent state parameters. Disclosure … continues until no designer wishes to reveal further information. We consider environments with general constraints on feasible …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273785
This paper explores the optimal design of biased contests. A designer imposes an identity-dependent treatment on contestants, which varies the balance of the playing field. A generalized lottery contest typically yields no closed-form equilibrium solutions, which nullifies the usual implicit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415462
signals, i.e. evidence. Evidence can either take the form of hard information or, more generally, have differential but non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690726
This paper studies bilateral trade in which the seller makes a hidden investment that influences the buyer's hidden valuation. In general it is impossible to implement both first-best efficient trade and efficient investment using budget-balanced trading mechanisms. The paper fully characterizes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700620
We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702289
We analyze the extent to which efficient trade is possible in an ongoing relationship between impatient agents with hidden valuations (i.i.d. over time), restricting attention to equilibria that satisfy ex post incentive constraints in each period. With ex ante budget balance, efficient trade...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702316