unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games of complete information. In this paper, we generalize their … results to contests with incomplete informa tion. Two assumptions are imposed on the information structure. First, the players …

quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide …. For the case where precise information about social preferences is available, we show that any tension between efficiency …

bargaining protocol. Subjects buy commodities that have different private values with assets that have common values and can be … subject to a private information problem. The asset plays the role of a medium of exchange, but this role can be affected by … its lack of "recognizability." We study a benchmark experiment where the OTC bargaining game takes place under complete …

psychologically robust mechanism. Such a mechanism can be implemented without information about the type or the intensity of social …

We introduce a simple two-stage game of endogenous network formation and information sharing for reasoning about the … between targeted and collective information sharing. Agents value being connected to other agents and sharing and receiving … information. We consider multiple utility specifications. We show that the game always has an equilibrium in pure strategies and …

This paper studies incentives for the interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all …

This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all …. We also consider partial information release, cheap talk, Bayesian persuasion, information design, correlation, and …

We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N ≥ 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1 … battlefield. In contrast to the single-unit case, however, agents never enjoy any information rent. We also outline an extension …