unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games of complete information. In this paper, we generalize their … results to contests with incomplete informa tion. Two assumptions are imposed on the information structure. First, the players …

quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide …. For the case where precise information about social preferences is available, we show that any tension between efficiency …

This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all …. We also consider partial information release, cheap talk, Bayesian persuasion, information design, correlation, and …

We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N ≥ 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1 … battlefield. In contrast to the single-unit case, however, agents never enjoy any information rent. We also outline an extension …

In this paper, we study N-player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about battlefield valuations. Such …

This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all …-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our … information is one-sided. However, the principle breaks down when contestants are potentially too similar in strength, possess …

This paper studies incentives for the interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all …

(ERA) is a first-price auction in which truthful bidding is encouraged by bonus payments. We test the robustness property …

spite extends to the seller. We experimentally test the model predictions by exogenously varying the presence of human …