Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this … effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to … strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask …

unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games of complete information. In this paper, we generalize their … results to contests with incomplete informa tion. Two assumptions are imposed on the information structure. First, the players …

We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N ≥ 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1 … battlefield. In contrast to the single-unit case, however, agents never enjoy any information rent. We also outline an extension …

In this paper, we study N-player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about battlefield valuations. Such …

This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all …-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our … information is one-sided. However, the principle breaks down when contestants are potentially too similar in strength, possess …

(ERA) is a first-price auction in which truthful bidding is encouraged by bonus payments. We test the robustness property …

spite extends to the seller. We experimentally test the model predictions by exogenously varying the presence of human …