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unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games of complete information. In this paper, we generalize their … results to contests with incomplete informa tion. Two assumptions are imposed on the information structure. First, the players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010208517
Colonel Blotto games with discrete strategy spaces effectively illustrate the intricate nature of multidimensional strategic reasoning. This paper studies the equilibrium set of such games where, in line with prior experimental work, the tie-breaking rule is allowed to be flexible. We begin by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014500423
We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N ≥ 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1 … battlefield. In contrast to the single-unit case, however, agents never enjoy any information rent. We also outline an extension …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012123363
In this paper, we study N-player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about battlefield valuations. Such …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012436059
(ERA) is a first-price auction in which truthful bidding is encouraged by bonus payments. We test the robustness property …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360336
Behavioral robustness is essential in mechanism design. Existing papers focus on robustness as captured by dominant strategies. This paper studies the novel concept of externality-robustness, which addresses players' motives to affect other players' monetary payoffs. One example is externalities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011389576
Behavioral robustness is essential in mechanism design. Existing papers focus on robustness as captured by dominant strategies. This paper studies the novel concept of externality-robustness, which addresses players' motives to affect other players' monetary payoffs. One example is externalities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011471404
spite extends to the seller. We experimentally test the model predictions by exogenously varying the presence of human …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011456510
The present paper constructs a novel solution to the chopstick auction, and thereby disproves a conjecture of Szentes and Rosenthal (Games and Economic Behavior, 2003a, 2003b). In contrast to the existing solution, the identified equilibrium strategy allows a simple and intuitive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011489976
This paper constructs a novel equilibrium in the chopstick auction of Szentes and Rosenthal (Games and Economic Behavior, 2003a, 2003b). In contrast to the existing solution, the identified equilibrium strategy allows a simple and intuitive characterization. Moreover, its best-response set has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011640552